Nelson & His World

I was reading a biography of Jervis recently, and came across a statement that seemed astonishly uncomprehending on at least three counts. It was to the effect that Nelson risked half his fleet by ordering them to go inside the French line at the Battle of the Nile.

Firstly, it was only the first ship, the Goliath, that was at risk of grounding. If she had, the others would not have followed. As she did not, the rest were at less risk by attacking the French on their unprepared side, and by doubling the French ships. Secondly, the risk of grounding was small - the fact that the French ships were at single anchor meant there must be room for them to swing, and hence also for the British to sail inside. Thirdly, Nelson did not order it - he was too far away to see whether it was possible. Foley lead the way inside the line using his own initiative, just as the Band of Brothers was encouraged to do.

It is said that Nelson took the Band of Brothers into his confidence during their hunt for the French fleet, inviting all the captains on board his ship for frequent consultations. It is also said that this is a myth that grew after the battle, and that some of the captains had never been onboard the Vanguard before the battle.

It is also true that Nelson's captains at the Nile were an elite bunch, hand picked for him by St Vincent.

So who should take credit for the Band of Brothers at the Battle of the Nile?

Re the comments about HN's leadership at the Nile.I seem to remember that it was HN's decision to attack the French by splitting his fleet and "sandwiching" the french between his guns that pre empted the demise of his relationship with Saumarez who was afterwards openly critical of his tactics. He suggested that by doing so, the english fleet had suffered unnecessary loss of life, from the inevitable stray firepower of the english cannon crossing from the opposing side, as they aimed at the french. I believe that after their difference, HN then immediately dispatched Saumarez to Gibraltar withn the Nile prizes soon afterwards but the two men never served together again. ( though I understand that HN did agree to take Saumarez's son into service with him at a later date (?a placatory gesture)- and if so, from which man?)-t

Tay, your most interesting comments about Saumarez's views prompted me to get down off the bookshelf "The Memoirs of Lord Saumarez" by Sir John Ross. He does indeed say that Saumarez opposed this tactic, having previously 'seen the evil consequences of doubling on the enemy especially in a night action'. It seems that prior to the Battle of the Nile, during one of Nelson's discussions of tactics with his captains (when and with how many is not stated), Saumarez disagreed with Nelson, saying that "it never required two English ships to capture one French, and that the damage which they [the two English ships] must necessarily do to each other might render them both unable to fight an enemy's ship that had not been engaged; and as in this case two ships could be spared to the three-decker, every one might have his own opponent".

There were no orders issued or signals made to pass inside the French line, but Nelson did signal that he intended to engage the enemy's van and centre. As the number of ships were equal, this did mean that Nelson intended to double on some of the French ships in the van and centre. However, doubling did not necessarily require "sandwiching" a French ship with two English ships on either side. A ship could be doubled by two opponents on the same side, one taking a position off the bow, and the other off the quarter (according to Clarke & M'Arthur this was Nelson's intention if taking up positions outside the French line). Saumarez in the Orion was the third to pass inside the line, and Sir John Ross argues that all the British ships should have taken up positions inside the French line, by passing through the gaps between the French ships, raking them as they did so. This would only be possible if the ships were far enough apart, and if they did not have cables attached between them, which would be difficult to see until close. Only one ship, the Theseus, did this. The difficulties of this proposal are illustrated by Saumarez's own problems; he went round the head of the line, overshot his intended position, failed to anchor by the stern and instead anchored by the bow. Nelson in the Vanguard was the first to anchor outside the French line, and thus started the "sandwiching", but by that time it was very crowded inside the line, and it must have been very uncertain that he could find a position inside without proceeding too far down the line.

Sir John Ross refuses to name the English ships which actually fired on each other, but says "that this did actually happen, and that many of our brave men fell by our own shot is a fact too notorious to be disputed".

The day after the battle, Saumarez, being wounded, was unable to go onboard the Vanguard, but sent Nelson a warm, congratulatory letter. The following day he was well enough to go onboard, and Sir John Ross gives this account:
'He found several of his brother officers on the quarter deck, discussing the merits of the action. Some regret having been expressed at the escape of the two sternmost ships of the French line, Sir James said to the Admiral, “It was unfortunate we did not -“, and was proceeding to say, “all anchor on the same side." But, before he could finish the sentence, Nelson hastily interrupted him exclaiming, “Thank God there was no order!'' thus turning the conversation, he entered his cabin, and sent for Captain Ball.
While Sir James was receiving the congratulations of his brother captains on being the second in command, no doubt being entertained among them that the Admiral would make most honourable mention of his name as such,—an honour which he so highly deserved, and which is usual in similar cases,—Captain Ball came on deck, and interrupted the conversation by observing, "Nelson says there is to be no second in command; we are all to be alike in his despatches!"
...
We may here state that, on the preceding day, Captain Ball had paid a visit to Sir James; and as they were discussing the various points of the battle, he stated to Sir James, that " having been the second in command, he would, unquestionably, receive some mark of distinction on the occasion." Saumarez, in the enthusiasm of the moment, exclaimed, " We all did our duty,—there was no second in command" meaning, of course, that he did not consider he had done more than other captains; and, not supposing that this observation would come to the ears of the Admiral. But, he afterwards thought, Nelson had availed himself of this conversation, to deprive him of the advantage to which his seniority entitled him, although he fully exonerated Captain Ball of having the slightest intention of communicating to the Admiral anything he could have supposed would be detrimental to his interest.'

It seems Saumarez believed that Nelson's decision not to recognise him as second in command was prompted by his remark about not all anchoring the same side.

The cause of all the trouble was of course Troubridge, who was junior to Saumarez, but was St Vincent's favourite. It had been St Vincent's intention that when Nelson was reinforced back in May, Saumarez should have returned to Cadiz so that Troubridge could be second in command. However Nelson by then knew the strength of the French fleet and could not spare Saumarez. He fudged the issue of second in command by making Saumarez and Troubridge equal commanders of divisions, which would not have pleased Saumarez. (Nelson may have been decisive when it came to battle, but was not always decisive in other matters!) When Troubridge missed the battle by running aground on a shoal, Saumarez must have felt there could be no doubt over his being recognised as second in command during the battle. Nelson subsequently wrote to St Vincent, asking that Troubridge should be as equally rewarded as Saumarez, and that neither should receive recognition the other did not. (It is interesting to speculate whether his motivation was his friendship with Troubridge or to ingratiate himself with St Vincent.) The result was that neither received more than the gold medal that the other captains received.

Interestingly, Collingwood complained privately that St Vincent did not pick him to join Nelson in the Mediterranean because he was senior to Troubridge, and so would have been problematic for Troubridge's advancement. Perhaps all this belongs in the 'Jealousies and Rivalries' thread?

Tony - that's a really interesting thread - and one which could run and run! For myself, I find the contasting personalities of HN , Troubridge, Saumarez, Collingwood ,Ball, etc as interesting as naval tactics, especially the famous Troubridge /Nelson /St Vincent interaction and rivalry( fuelled by HN and Emm'a relationship perhaps?), Ludovic Kennedy's "Nelson and his Captains" being one of my favourite reads.(in it, the portrait of Sam Hood who also lost his arm, looks uncannily like HN!)
As regards personalities, I wonder whether it took a particular type of personality to captain a Frigate, which of course undertook a very different type of work that the average 74.... or was it that Frigate captains were on the whole, younger men ? -t

Tay,

Frigates were the 'eyes of the fleet' and went ahead of it to scout out enemy, but they were very often detached on other missions and were thus often far from an Admiral or the encumberances of a fleet. From this it can be seen that the officers who commanded them were expected to possess abilities above the norm. Certainly many naval officers 'broke their teeth' on them in their youth, before they went on to the command of larger ships within a fleet, and their usual ambition was to be given a frigate on being made post. Therein, for many, also loomed the prospect of prizemoney and made fortunes.

Nelson is a case in point, although not particularly in the case of prize money, since he spent a large part of his younger naval career in frigates. It is partly for this reason that he is also thought to have had such a rapore with his ship's crews, one gets to know the men better on a smaller ship. In actual fact when he came to command the 64 gun 'Agamemnon' he sailed her very much like a frigate, to the consternation of his Admirals!

I suppose frigates were, by their nature and the things expected of them, a young man's command but this was by no means so right across the board and it very often depended on the officer's character. We often think perhaps of men like Nelson, Cochrane, and William Hoste, the latter only 31 at Lissa in 1811, but there were also men like Captain Henry Blackwood of the Euryalus at Trafalgar, considerably older but of proven ability in that type of ship.

Kester