Nelson & His World

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 Post subject: ‘Great Expectations: the Approach of Br Ships at Trafalgar
PostPosted: Sun Nov 07, 2010 12:55 pm 
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The latest edition of the Society of Nautical Research’s journal, ‘The Mariners Mirror‘, includes an article by Tony Beales entitled ‘Great Expectations: the Approach of British Ships at the Battle of Trafalgar’. Although not a book, this article is of such interest as to warrant an entry in this section.
An uninformed observer might think that, after two hundred years of constant attention and the production of hundreds of books on the subject, there is nothing left to know about the battle of Trafalgar and that the article would therefore contain little more than a few additional details to a well established story. In fact nothing could be further from the truth. Although the outline of the battle and the performance of the principal actors in it are well established, many of the details – the order of ships in the battle and the actual performance of each, for example – remain uncertain and, as we all know, the devil (and the truth) lies in the detail.
One of the consequences of this hiatus was an article by Michael Duffy in the 2005 Centenary edition of the ‘Mariners Mirror’ meaningfully entitled ‘All Hushed Up: the Hidden Trafalgar’. Duffy suggested that Collingwood’s victory despatch had deliberately made no mention of the fact that there were whispers of dissatisfaction in the fleet about the performance of some ships in the rear. Most had fought well enough when they had eventually reached the enemy (or the enemy’s van had reached them), but - in an engagement in which Nelson was relying on speed and close action - they had been too slow at getting into action, had fired at too great a distance and, when they eventually reached the Franco-Spanish line, had shamelessly taken helpless prizes that had already been crippled by more active vessels. Britannia, Prince, Defence, Agamemnon, Polyphemus, Minotaur and Spartiate were specifically named.
The article caused quite a stir. By way of reply, it was asserted that no one had in fact failed to do his duty. There was a perfectly good explanation for these anomalies in that the wind was light; many of the named ships were notoriously slow; the gunfire of vessels in action would have killed the wind for those which were not; ships in the rear had farther to sail in order to reach their positions; some had inexperienced captains; and the temptation to fire too soon by ships which could see the battle but could not get into action quickly enough was understandable.
In general terms this explanation seemed reasonable. But it terms of specifics, it still failed to answer doubts relating to the actions of the ships in question. A definitive conclusion could only be arrived when someone had the time, skill and experience to examine the logs of the British ships, to plot their position and approach during the morning on an almost hourly basis, and to examine the response of individual captains to the signals received and the challenges posed by the flukiness of the wind and the mobile nature of the target. In an excellent and important piece of research, this is exactly what Tony has done. His article is not just a useful addition to what is already available on Trafalgar, but constitutes a vital piece of information without which what actually happened on the 21 October 1805 cannot be fully understood. Every member of this web site should, by hook or by crook, get a copy.
One of the refreshing features of the article is that it does not follow the traditional fleet-dominated descriptions of the battle in which the British ships are seen as approaching an almost immobile Franco-Spanish crescent neatly line ahead in two lines like beads on a string. Instead Tony moves the focus to individual ships with different sailing capabilities and speeds scattered, as dawn broke, over miles of sea. Some - like Defence - were far to the north, others - like Agamemnon - were far to the south and had to make up time having repairing a broken topmast. The preparatory stage of the battle is thus seen from the human perspective as captains of varying levels of experience and ability struggled to reach their places in the respective lines of battle (often crossing the courses of others in order to do so), then to trim their sails so as to keep their position in the line, then make course adjustments in response to signals, then get the best from their ships and reach their targets in a moving Franco-Spanish crescent. This was complicated by the fact that Collinwood’s ships did not follow each other in neat ‘line ahead’ but sailed towards the enemy at an angle to each other. In calculating the most efficient course needed to achieve these objectives, some captains inevitably made better decisions, or were luckier, than others. Tony’s conclusion that variations in course and delays in arrival were inevitable consequences of the initial difficulties in forming the line, of the distances that had to be covered, of the different capabilities of the ships and of the different choices made by their captains (and were not due, by extrapolation, to any reluctance to engage) is totally compelling. The question raised in Michael Duffy’s article is thus decisively answered. Or almost. Tony is circumspect and objective in his article and says little about the performance of the Earl of Northesk (in Britannia) and Grindall (captain of Prince). Was Captain Rotherham’s later denunciation their lack of zeal in the battle justified or was it just spleen? Perhaps Tony could give us his private view in this more indiscrete web site.

Brian


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 Post subject: Re: ‘Great Expectations: the Approach of Br Ships at Trafalgar
PostPosted: Mon Nov 08, 2010 12:09 pm 
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Brian,

I have, 'by hook or by crook', managed to obtain a copy of Tony's article. I have not yet read it, but I shall do with immense interest, and I am sure that he will have opened new ground here (or should that be carved a new wake?)

Trafalgar was certainly not the decisive battle that, for example, the Nile was for just the reasons you (and I am sure Tony) have stated, but the mere fact that they were not the 'band of brothers' that had been the victors of the earlier battle, must surely I think have had some bearing. Many of the captains had not sailed under Nelson before, or with each other, were hastily assembled from many different commands and there were many other reasons. Thus, despite Nelson's usual captain's meetings and issued orders, they were still somewhat unsure of his intentions and followed their own inclinations. Nelson, despite his exertions, would naturally would have understood this, hence perhaps his words that no captain can do very wrong, if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy, and perhaps also one of the reasons for his famous signal. Maybe also his words, as he lay dying on the orlop, 'that is well, but I had bargained for twenty', might be an admission that the fleet's performance left something to be desired.

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Kester.


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 Post subject: Re: ‘Great Expectations: the Approach of Br Ships at Trafalgar
PostPosted: Mon Nov 08, 2010 4:41 pm 
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Thanks for that Kester.
On reflection, you are quite right. No admiral before Nelson could have gone into action with complete confidence that all his captains would act with zeal, intelligence and a full understanding of his intentions- and this apprehension would generally have been justified. Even after the triumph and boost to morale given by the Nile, it would be unrealistic to expect a total transformation to have occurred (especially in the circumstances of the lead up to Trafalgar as you describe them.)
I think that Tony makes a good case that physical factors played a large part in explaining the actions of many captains whose arrival was tardy; but perhaps there were some whose performance cannot be so excused.
Having mastered the details, would Tony like to point the finger? Northesk and Grindall could provide starting points.

Brian


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 Post subject: Re: ‘Great Expectations: the Approach of Br Ships at Trafalgar
PostPosted: Mon Nov 08, 2010 7:31 pm 
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Thank you, Brian; I am most flattered by your very kind appraisal of my article, and particularly glad that you think it an important addition to the body of knowledge. I am also very grateful for the excellent introduction that you have provided to the context of the article. Space limitations prevented me from providing such an introduction in the article itself, which I am afraid relies on the endnotes to refer readers back to the previous debate. For anyone interested in the subject who is not already familiar with Michael Duffy’s 2005 article (M. Duffy, ‘All was Hushed up: the Hidden Trafalgar’, Mariner’s Mirror 91:2, 2005), it is of course essential reading. However, an alternative is his chapter in the book ‘A Great and Glorious Victory’, in which he does also cover the same ground: M. Duffy, ‘Trafalgar: Myth & Reality’, in R. Harding, ed., A Great and Glorious Victory: The Battle of Trafalgar Conference Papers. In my opinion, the other piece of essential reading is Marianne Czisnik's article in History journal: M. Czisnik, ‘Admiral Nelson’s Tactics at the Battle of Trafalgar’, History, 89, 2004.

But I am not sure that I am quite as circumspect in the article as you perhaps suggest, Brian, and some officers are certainly not off the hook in terms of the question of reluctance to engage. Space limitations made me somewhat economical with words, but for example, I concurred with Duffy in saying that the Britannia made relatively good speed, but that Northesk held back from passing through the enemy line, and that the Britannia clearly failed to carry out Nelson’s instructions to engage closely. It is also not quite right to extrapolate that late entry into action as a result of the course chosen by the captain therefore excludes any reluctance to engage. I think I demonstrate that the very late arrival of the Prince was not primarily due to her speed (which removes one of the mainstays of Grindall’s defence), but due more to the course steered, which I suggest in the article resulted from either Grindall’s confusion or his reluctance to engage.

Duffy probably questioned more the competence of captains than their courage, and there are certainly more questions to be answered there. Your mention of the Agamemnon is one example that Duffy raised. She was late into action because she was out of position at the start of the morning. But the topmast had been repaired the previous afternoon, so why wasn’t she back in her station by the next morning? And was the loss of the topmast bad luck or bad seamanship? Then once Berry got into action, even his biographers could find little to give him credit for.

Duffy pointed out that there were more than ‘whispers of dissatisfaction in the fleet’, and that Collingwood himself privately stated that ‘some of the ships in the rear of my line, although good sailing ships, did not answer my expectations fully’. Given the performance of ships like the Britannia and Agamemnon in Nelson’s line, it intrigued me that Collingwood reserved his criticism for ships in his own line. Why? Perhaps because they were directly under his command, and certainly when he wrote that comment he was still building up a picture of what had happened, but he was by then Commander-in-chief, and would certainly have wanted to be even-handed in apportioning any blame, even if in private. It seemed to me that he felt there must have been a greater failure in his own line. On this question, Duffy left us on the edge of our seats in suspense, saying for example that the late entry of the Defence into action was ‘a mystery’, and that her slow approach was ‘inexplicable’. Well, mysteries are there to be solved…

Initially, as I started to delve into it, the mystery deepened. At daybreak, the Defence was far, far closer than any other ship to the enemy line, yet she was one of the very last ships into action. So what happened? Then there were those peculiar signals during the morning from the Defence to the Phoebe (to come to the wind) and to the Orion (first to make more sail, and then to alter course). I had wondered about those before. What was going on? Then looking at the log, the Defence was steering SbW at 11 am when the rest of the fleet was steering E or ESE for the enemy fleet. Wow! Despite all those words previously written on Trafalgar, there was very obviously a story here that hadn’t been told! It was time to plot her course…

Following the same approach paid dividends with other ships, from which a wider picture started to emerge. It seemed clear that by mid-morning, Nelson’s plan for Collingwood’s column to deliver a simultaneous and overwhelming attack on the enemy rear had been compromised by a gaping hole in Collingwood’s line. As you suggest, Kester, uncertainty amongst captains probably played a part in this, and I allude to it in the article. The word ‘confusion’ also appears in my article, and in ‘this more indiscrete website’, I think it is safe to suggest that given the lack of wind, by mid-morning the plan was in tatters! Instead, it was replaced by a plan which got Collingwood’s first eight ships into action in quick succession, but with the numerical superiority intended to deliver annihilation now reversed. I think this is the key to Collingwood’s remark about his expectations, and I hope my article goes some way to show how this situation developed, and how both Nelson and Collingwood reacted to it.

But it is very difficult to distinguish between lack of certainty, lack of competence and lack of courage, and the Polyphemus provides a good example. I show how Redmill was delayed by his curious curve to the north, but was he unsure of where he should be, or was he affected by his illness, or was he shirking?

I do suspect there was uncertainty over the importance of station keeping. Nelson’s order of battle was of great importance to his plan, with firepower concentrated at the head of the lines in the three-deckers and the larger, more heavily armed of the 74s. Only the slower Britannia, Dreadnought and Prince were ordered to form the line as convenient without regard to the order of battle, and thus all other ships were expected to take their correct station. There was also honour attached to getting into action in the correct station, so captains would have been reluctant to damage another’s honour by taking their station without that captain’s permission or without an order from the commander. It is easy to criticise too much attention to station keeping, but at what stage did captains become free to follow Nelson’s fallback order to use whatever mode of attack they thought best to get alongside an enemy?

As I say in the article, I do also believe there was uncertainty in how to execute the order in signal 76, to bear up and steer east. Strict interpretation of the order meant to bear up in succession, and thus precluded ‘cutting the corner’ to get into action quicker, which no doubt Nelson would have wished, but which Rutherford failed to do in the Swiftsure. Argument on this point was raging over a hundred years ago, but plotting the ships’ courses brings some objectivity to it.

But then there are a few ships where I did not find sufficient information to draw any conclusion, so perhaps the debate can continue for another hundred years!

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Tony


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 Post subject: Re: ‘Great Expectations: the Approach of Br Ships at Trafalgar
PostPosted: Wed Nov 10, 2010 6:37 pm 
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Tony wrote:
Your mention of the Agamemnon is one example that Duffy raised. She was late into action because she was out of position at the start of the morning. But the topmast had been repaired the previous afternoon, so why wasn’t she back in her station by the next morning? And was the loss of the topmast bad luck or bad seamanship? Then once Berry got into action, even his biographers could find little to give him credit for.


Tony,

I agree and would have thought that Agamemnon had ample time to get back on station, following the damage to the topmast the previous day. Regarding the damage, surely repairing a topmast wouldn't have been any great problem for skilled seamen, who must have done it several times before and were normally well practiced at such repairs at sea. As to whether it was bad luck or bad seamanship, Berry had been in scrapes like this before, most notably of course as Nelson's flag captain in the Vanguard before the Nile, when the ship was virtually dismasted. My take on that, is that it must have been very well known that the Bay of Lyons was notorious for the effects of the Mistral, but seemingly Berry was not prepared for it and was thus not shortened down in time. Perhaps it was the same this time? Thus I get the feeling that he was not the seamen that other captains were and that his biographers might well be right!

The fact that the wind was very light on the 21st, certainly does not excuse the actions that the various captains took to get into battle (or not) but it would doubtless have been something of a problem. Only the day before, the winds were 'fresh breezes SSW and rainy', and before that they appear to have been moderate from the NNW or W, all of which indicated approaching bad weather. My question is however, was the British fleet as a whole taken by surprise by the lack of wind on the morning of the 21st? I would imagine the ships' masters at least would have had some inkling of its dying away, due to the swell that was setting in, but it seems that generally the fleet might have been expecting similar winds to those on previous days. Presumably Nelson himself was expecting rather more wind, in order to carry out the dangerous manouver that he had devised for attacking the combined fleet. If that has been the case, certainly the approach would have been far speedier and action joined rather sooner than it was. However, he had laid his plans some time before and it was obviously too late to change them, so consequently he had to make the best of the situation. It was a pity that some of his captains don't seem to have had the same attitude.

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Kester.


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