Nelson & His World

With 2010 marking the bi-centenary of Collingwood's death, Northeast-Maritime has been busy putting together a four part documentary of Collingwood on YouTube. Here is the first part:

Part 2:

Part 3:

Part 4:

Many thanks for posting those links, Tony. Max Adams's biography of Collingwood has for too long been gathering dust on my 'to read' pile, but this tribute has ensured that it will be next on my list.

I thought the four parts were very well assembled and illustrated, and the background music - that I usually find irritatingly intrusive in pieces of this kind - was singularly well-chosen.

One of the 'you tube' comments refers to Collingwood as 'the man who won the battle of Trafalgar.' I wonder if any of the experts here has a comment.

I thought perhaps I would respond while we wait for the experts...

You won't be surprised to know that I think there were others who contributed to the victory! Once the Royal Sovereign and the Victory were engaged, Nelson and Collingwood really played no part in directing the battle. The battle was already won before Collingwood started issuing orders in its final stages. But I do happen to believe that during the approach Collingwood was more alert to developing problems in the formation of the lines than Nelson. But Collingwood was implementing Nelson's plan, so I certainly see no reason to single him out above Nelson.

Tony, Anna,

Thanks for posting that and I think I'll be doing rather more reading about Collingwood, in this special year!

Although the Utube links were informative, I'm afraid that I did find the music a little intrusive and, it has to be said (unfortunately quite usual with history programmes and period dramas), it was often out of context, ie. it came from either an earlier or later period. Perhaps I'm nit-picking, but a little delving around might have come up with the right music. (Loved the drum and fife music though!) The same could be said of many of the pictures, of which I thought they used rather too many.

Although far from an expert, I think Tony is right, that after the flagships were engaged, the battle more or less unfolded as it would. The initial master stroke, although undoubtedly risky, was in Nelson's approach, cutting the enemy line into three at right angles. The combined fleet weren't expecting this and being disorganised to begin with, this only led them into even more confusion and defeat. So, I think Nelson undoubtedly won the battle, but with the help of Collingwood and that of other captains.

Where I think Collingwood was invaluable, was in being a good second in command and in the management of the fleet and the captured enemy ships during the gale and afterwards. A man of lesser judgement may not have handled it so well. A great pity after all that, that he never saw family or home again.

Kester, as you know, not everyone was of the same opinion about Collingwood's management of the fleet after the battle. Here are some quotes from Captain Edward Codrington (written to his friend Lord Garlies, a Lord of the Admiralty):

Well, I had hoped my last post would provoke somebody into the spirited defence of Collingwood that he so richly deserves, but apparently not!

To balance the picture, I have to say that I think Codrington has been treated far too kindly by the historians. He was from an aristocratic background and both Collingwood’s ideas of duty and merchant class origins were anathema to Codrington. He was signal lieutenant in Howe’s flagship at the Glorious 1st of June and achieved rapid promotion to post captain in 1795. In 1797, after only two years as captain, and with his foot on the ladder to flag rank, he then took 8 years off ashore. In May 1805 he was appointed to the Orion through parliamentary influence (at the specific request of William Pitt), and the Orion was ready to join the fleet in August, just 2 months before Trafalgar. When he joined Collingwood off Cadiz, he immediately started complaining about the lack of social intercourse allowed by Collingwood, and when Nelson arrived a month later, he immediately praised him for the relaxation of the strict regime. He seems to have entirely missed the point that Collingwood’s task was to maintain a tight blockade to keep the enemy in Cadiz, whereas Nelson’s task was now to entice them out by loosening the blockade!

As is only reasonable, Codrington’s accounts of Trafalgar dwell much on his own skill and cool-headedness as well as the performance of his ship and crew. He provides considerable detail, and is thus a valuable source for historians, who inevitably swallow his version hook, line and sinker, uncritically praising his initiative in supporting other British ships. He was late into action, abandoned the weather column and made towards the rear and the Santa Ana, which had already struck to the Royal Sovereign before he got there. He cruised around looking for targets, and found the French Swiftsure, already severely battered by the Colossus, and was able to finish her off with just three broadsides. Despite there being a number of enemy ships at the rear not closely engaged, he was not able to engage any of them (and they subsequently escaped). He complained he was blocked by the Ajax and the Dreadnought, and also by the risk of friendly fire from others. He then demonstrated the manoeuvrability and speed of his undamaged ship by sailing the length of the battlefield and relieving the Leviathan and Africa from their duel with the Intrepide with an undeniably skilful and effective attack that forced her to strike.

It is clear that he was very careful to avoid damage from enemy ships by not exposing himself to their broadsides, and by raking their stern or bows, or remaining on their quarter. While this is exactly what any captain tried to do whenever possible, I would question whether he could have done more earlier if he had been prepared to get alongside an enemy ship broadside to broadside. I would also question what Nelson would have thought of Codrington holding back to avoid exposing himself to the possibility of friendly fire. In that situation, would Nelson not have pressed ahead and hoped for the best? Codrington also held back during the approach. Michael Duffy (‘All was Hushed Up: The Hidden Trafalgar’, Mariner’s Mirror, 2005) has highlighted the fact that Codrington’s own log records that he shortened sail to remain in station, which suggests that he could perhaps have passed the Ajax if he had asked. His letter to his wife rather anxiously maintains that there is no dishonour in a ship being late into action if she is in her correct station. His correspondence also clearly shows he was worried that he would be judged by the light casualties in the Orion.

Soon after the battle Codrington began carping about Collingwood again in his letters to Lord Garlies, his aristocratic friend on the Board of the Admiralty.

Nelson was able to inspire loyalty in his captains, whatever their background. In contrast, Collingwood seems to have found this much more difficult, and I get the impression of a sharp divide between those who saw through his reserve and those who didn’t. My guess is that to some extent this was also a class divide.

Thank you for that awesome assessment, Tony.

Codrington was not alone in regarding Collingwood as no match for Nelson. I've quoted Blackwood's letter to his wife, written the day after Trafalgar (Nicolas, vii, 225-7) on another thread but it bears repeating here:

'Almost all seemed as if inspired by the one common sentiment of conquer or die...Lord Nelson.... has left cause for every man who had a heart never to forget him...I hope it is not injustice to the second in command...who fought like a hero, to say that the Fleet, under any other, never would have performed what they did under Lord N. But under Lord N. it seemed like inspiration to most of them.'