Nelson & His World

Fireships must have been brutal weapons of war in the days of sail. Weren't they also rather risky? I presume old, useless ships were filled with explosives and combustibles and allowed to drift unmanned. There must have been an ever-present danger of early explosions before the enemy ships were reached, or a change of wind direction which might send a blazing ship towards, rather than away from, those who sent it on its way. How reliable were fireships in wreaking havoc among the enemy rather than one's own side?

Anna!
Like you I would like to know more about fireships, the extent of their use and success or otherwise and hope(d) that some of our colleagues would provide some enlightenment. So far no-one has answered the challenge so, for what it is worth, here is my halfpenny’s worth – based almost entirely on Lord Cochrane’s experience both in the Royal Navy and afterwards.
1.There is a long piece in Falconer’s Marine Dictionary about how the combustibles in fireships were fitted and arranged. The impression is that it was a skill expected of most, if not all, naval officers
2.Sometimes, fireships were old vessels or expendable prizes; but at others they were seaworthy ships that were specially fitted in dockyards for a possibly decisive role. At the Basque Roads for example, 20 fireships and two explosion vessels (to blow up the protective boom) were released on the anchored enemy. Three were sent specially prepared from England; the rest were fitted out on the spot by the ships of Gambier’s Squadron.
3.They were not released in flames at a great distance, but were manned by small crews which sailed them within reach of the enemy, lit the fuses, trimmed the sails (presumably only the lower ones were rigged), lashed the wheel, then hastily exited to be picked up by escorting ships.
4.The minimum rig carried meant that an attack could only take place if the wind blew steadily from the stern or the quarters – which means that the chances of them being blown back to the distant ‘mother’ squadron was pretty slim. The ships were also fitted so that the fire spread from the stern with the wind.
5.At the Basque Roads, Cochrane’s attack was dazzlingly successful in that the French ships cut their cables in panic and were quickly beached on the mud. However I think an important factor here was that the wind was very strong which prevented the enemy from taking measured evasive action such as intercepting the fireships and towing then out the way. The night before, when the wind was moderate, the French Admiral had deployed large numbers of launches and cutters to do precisely this. When the attack actually took place the conditions were too bad to allow his boats to take up position.
6.Chances of success were nevertheless moderate. In some actions, sudden changes of wind or unknown tides drove fireships off course; while in others, enemy fire destroyed them before they reached their destination. It was also difficult to estimate the length of the fuses, so that at the Basque Roads, for example, the strength of the wind made them burn faster than anticipated so that many ignited the cargo too early and they burnt out before they reached the enemy.
7.If the Basque Roads is anything to go by, it looks as if the main purpose of fireships was panic the enemy into some risky evasive action by ‘shock and awe’ tactics rather than the expectation that they would actually set them ablaze.

Brian

Great post, Brian! Informative and illuminating, as always. Many thanks!

Anna,

One thing Brian didn't mention was the nerve, or the lack of, of the fireship crews themselves when it came to the actual operation! I think this was a factor in many cases, with the attack either failing or not being pursued with as much determination as might have been hoped for, by the officer in command. I seem to recall this actually happened at Basque Roads to a certain extent – although I am sure Brian will correct me if I'm wrong. It was probably true that the fire ship's 'panic value' was significantly greater than the possibility of enemy ships being set ablaze!

Another practical point perhaps worth mentioning, is that fireships often had their gun ports hinged on their bottom edge so that they would stay open, thus increasing the oxygen to the flames.

Thanks for the post Kester, but I must respond!
Lord Cochrane was an aggressive and successful commander but he had some very disturbing personality traits when it came to dealing with other people. In command of a small group in a single ship - as with 'Speedy', 'Imperieuse' etc - he was a true leader of men and had confidence in his followers and visa-versa. But when in charge of a wider group of vessels, and working with a larger number of people he did not know, the suspiciuous and mistrustful attitude he showed towards them bordered on paranoia - especially if they disagreed with him about prize money or did not provide enough praise or (in his view) reward! Starting with the Basque Roads, every action in which Cochrane was involved, whether in Britain, Chile or Brazil followed the same pattern - brilliant victories followed by unjustified accusations by Cochrane that he had been let down by his subordinates and ignored and held in contempt by his superiors. There is no evidence that this is true and, although it is possible that such a situation might occur once in an officer's career, for it to happen over and over again suggests that the problem lay in his mind rather than in reality. Cochrane's was an unhappy man and his tragedy was that his inner uncertainties prevented him from enjoying his undoubted triumphs. Within days, the euphoria of victory had been replaced by festering resentment at the supposed actions or attitudes of others.
Basque Roads was the first example of this trend. Because the action was not quite as successful as he had hoped, Cochrane's mind inevitably led him to look for scapegoats and he found them in Lord Gambier, at one extreme, and at the crews of the fire ships at the other, whom he accused of compromising his efforts by abandoning their vessels too early. The real reason - as I mentioned last time - was that although they lighted the fuses at the usual time (I seem to remember this was an estimated 15 minutes from impact), the unusual strength of the wind meant that they burned too quickly.
One has to admit that Cochrane was a military genius. But I wish admiring biographers would not assume that he must therefore have been a nice man. The tragedy for those under Cochrane's command is that he felt obliged to highlight his own achievements by denouncing those around him as being deficient, devious and hostile - a 'fact' which he seemed to believe. And he made sure, in his memoirs, that the reputations of scores of honest men, both high or lowly, who were doing their best but had been unlucky enough to provoke his hostility and suspicion were eternally damned.
I wait nervously to see what picture of this Scottish Hero emerges from the forthcoming exhibition in the National Museum of Scotland
Sorry to go on. But it is a bit of a hobby horse!

Brian

Brian,

Thanks for your response!

Thanks also for 'illuminating' the episode of Cochrane and the fireships. He certainly was a complex man. I can well understand that he is a 'hobby horse' of yours, I have your book – besides his autobiography, which is presumably somewhat biased!

Amen to that - and not just in respect of Cochrane. I wish we could sometimes hear less of the 'band of brothers' stuff, and more of Fremantle's unforgiving imperiousness, Troubridge's psychotic violence, Codrington's carping disloyalty, Hardy's ruthless discipline... But from what you read, you would sometimes think the navy was officered by men universally humane, wise, magnanimous, loved by their seamen, and generous to a fault. As my sons would say, "Yeah, right...".

Tony,

I would agree there. Two hundred years ago they were all living and breathing human beings just as we are today and, since we all have our own faults and shortcomings, I'm sure they had theirs. I think this has very often often been overlooked, or not thought important, since they're dead – perhaps another legacy of the Victorians!

We do have an ongoing thread 'Cruel and Bullying Officers' where all can feel free to lambast a favourite villain.

viewtopic.php?f=1&t=36&hilit=cruel+bullying

We also have Kind Officers thread too but no one responded to my invitation to list any!

I'm not sure I would want to label Hardy as a 'favourite villain' and I'm not aware of any evidence that he was 'bullying', but just eight days after Trafalgar he gave six of his seamen that had fought in the battle 36 lashes. 36 lashes is a cruel punishment by most standards, and I would think about the most a captain could get away with. Hardy routinely used 36 lashes, even for drunkenness.

Maybe I should have said ' - perhaps another legacy of the Victorians, to preserve their version of the 'golden age' of naval history!'

I believe the usual and minimal punishment for minor offences, such as drunkeness, was twelve lashes, so Hardy obviously increased that number by three. The number of lashes was of course decided on by the captain and Hardy was not the only one who 'laid on', but it would be interesting to know the circumstances. Presumably the storm had died down by then, and I wonder if these men had either broached the licqour stores aboard the Victory, or been part of a prize crew on board an enemy ship and become drunk there.

I think, seeing what they'd just been through, I'd have been rather more lenient!

I believe that Admiralty regulations were that 12 lashes was the maximum punishment a captain was allowed to order, but this was ignored. The punishment on 29 October (about the time Victory reached Gibraltar) was for the more serious crime of contempt and disobedience of orders, but a total of 23 men were given 36 lashes each for drunkenness during October before the Battle of Trafalgar.

During the 18 months after Victory joined the Mediterranean fleet, Hardy ordered 380 floggings. During the period Beatty was surgeon, Hardy ordered 225 floggings. 60% of these were for drunkenness, and the average punishment for drunkenness was 36 lashes, with 48 and even 60 lashes inflicted on persistent offenders (Brockliss: 'Nelson's Surgeon'). I don't think punishments of 36 lashes were particularly unusual at the time, but I would have thought were more usually reserved for serious crimes or repeat offenders. I would guess that 36 lashes as an average punishment for drunkenness was very unusual.

Having just looked up the more detailed statistics, even I am surprised at the degree of severity. It is certainly not the usual (and misleading) picture that is painted, and that perhaps leads you to look for 'extenuating circumstances' to explain such punishments, Kester?

Sorry, got a bit off topic there - back to fire-ships:

As far as I can see, fire-ships were used only twice in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars: once in the evacuation of Toulon in 1793 (Vulcan), and once at Basque Roads in 1809 as described by Brian. Is this right? If so, then most designated fire-ships were never used for their intended purpose and spent their years being used as a normal sloop.

Earlier the special dangers of fire-ship service had been recognised by the award of gold medals or chains to captains, and this was also done after Basque Roads with a specially designed gold medal awarded to Commander Wooldridge of the Mediator (rather less aptly named than the Vulcan).

This book I've just encountered on Amazon should provide interesting information - rather expensive, though:


https://www.amazon.co.uk/Fireship-Terro ... 417&sr=8-1