Nelson & His World

A couple of thoughts on the attack on Santa Cruz, having just read Colin White's '1797 - Nelson's Year of Destiny':

First, can we blame it all on Troubridge for aborting the first attack? He was way behind schedule in the approach of the boats, and had lost the element of total surprise, but there was still the chance of pressing home the attack before the Spanish defence was fully deployed.

Then why did Nelson choose to attack the mole? With an attacking force of a thousand, was it overconfidence, having received intelligence that the Spaniards had only 300 regular forces (the true figure was 400)? But overconfidence doesn't tally with his letter to Andrew Snape Hamond where he said he had had but a forlorn hope of success.

And why, with intelligence that the Spanish had few forces, did he chose to attack a position so easily defended by a few well positioned guns and a small force? He reported that the attack on the mole was pinned down by 30 or 40 guns, but in fact he was fired on by only about ten guns, but which could sweep the mole with grape shot. He had detailed knowledge of the layout of the town and the defences from both a deserter and one of his captains, so it seems a strange decision to me.

The boats were attached to each other with tow ropes to keep them together, but they cast off from each other before reaching the mole. Why?

I have just finished re-reading Andrew Lambert’s ‘Nelson: Britannia’s God of War’.

He criticises Troubridge for his hesitation: ‘When the alarm was raised ashore, Troubridge, in tactical command, hesitated and went back to consult Nelson just when he should have pushed on. It was a rare failure for so bold and enterprising a man. A second attempt to capture higher ground in broad daylight left the men roasted by the sun, and then dismayed to find they had climbed the wrong hill. They retreated in bad humour’.

Edgar Vincent, in ‘Nelson: Love and Fame’, says that ‘Most naval historians have concluded that Troubridge might have had a fair chance of success had he pressed ahead with his first attack, bypassed the fort if necessary (a possibility envisaged in his orders) and made his way directly to Santa Cruz, relying on landed guns and the powerful back-up of the squadron to support his beachhead and advance.’

Regarding Nelson’s decision to attack the mole, Lambert says: ‘In attempting an assault on well-prepared shore defences from the sea, at night, and with only small arms, the British were relying on surprise to unsettle the defenders. If the Spaniards ….defended their position till daybreak, the attack must fail.’

Edgar Vincent also points out the folly and inherent risks of a night attack, concluding: ‘Thus every atom of logic and military insight spoke against the wisdom or necessity of a night attack and yet Nelson went ahead.’

Vincent explores further his reason for attacking: ‘The unfolding of this inept and unlucky fiasco touched every officer and man in the squadron and placed an irresistible pressure on Nelson to do something to recover the situation. His reputation was at stake.’ This seems to be confirmed by Nelson’s own letter to Jervis 27 July 1797, Nicholas II p. 423ff) ‘Thus foiled in my original plan, I considered it for the honour of my King and Country not to give over the attempt to possess ourselves of the Town, that our enemies may be convinced that there is nothing which Englishmen are not equal to.’ He adds that Nelson ‘did not critically examine the intelligence that the enemy had ‘only 300 men of regular troops, the rest are peasants who are frightened to death’, because it supported what he wanted to do.’

Vincent also points out that Nelson gave an entirely misleading account of his part in the attack: ‘Captains Fremantle, Bowen and myself, with four or five boats, stormed the Mole, although opposed apparently by 400-500 men, took possession of it and spiked the guns…’ He mentions neither his wound nor where he was when he was wounded. Betsy Fremantle noted in her diary, presumably on information received from her husband who was with Nelson at the time, ‘The Admiral was wounded as he was getting out of the boat.’’

Vincent concludes that the British ‘had been defeated by their own injudicious leader as by a more resolute than expected enemy….. yet…the framing of Nelson’s dispatch, exaggeration of enemy numbers and the number of guns brought to bear on them, their ill luck in the raging surf, the loss of men, the apparent resourcefulness of Troubridge in his game of bluff with Gutiérrez…and the loss of Nelson’s arm together conspired to transmute a disastrous attack into a magnificent failure.’

However, Andrew Lambert points out that when Nelson explained the failure to Jervis, ‘he made no mention of the Councils of War, or the advice of others, taking full responsibility while praising the heroism of his followers. This was greatness in adversity. It explains why so many men wanted to follow him. Under his guidance, they would be able to use their skill and contribute to the planning, without being held to blame, even in private, if things went wrong’.

Incidentally, Lambert, giving no sources, says that ‘the local defences were in good repair, and adequately manned by 800 professional soldiers, 110 French sailors and 700 local militia.’

Nelson's defeat at Santa Cruz must count as one of the worst, if not the worst, reverses he suffered - alongside that of Boulogne. I suppose it must be to some extent hurtful to any Nelson student to have to admit that the defeat and loss of life must be put down to his vanity, overconfidance and misplaced belief that the Spanish 'cannot make men'. It would seem his ego had also been bolstered by Cape St. Vincent, and perhaps the Spanish guard boat attack off Cadiz a month earlier. To this I think we must add the fact that, seemingly at any cost, he didn't want to disappoint his Commander-in-Chief.

As regards the operation as a whole there are also the weather conditions to take into account, which was decidedly against the British attack. There was a strong offshore current, which the encumbered boats could not easily counter and which was probably the reason why some were swept passed the designated landing place, notably the mole. Three questions here: a) did the British not know about the current? b) if they did, why were they then not sufficiently up-current to gain their objective? c) why did they all make for the obvious target of the mole in any case? Beside this there was also a strong wind. These factors would, from the outset, have made any landing at least difficult, with the added problem of tiring the men and leaving them practically exhausted even before they made the beach, let alone fighting when they reached it! The weather and currents also prevented the larger ships from coming close inshore to bombard the batteries with their heavier guns before the boats went in, which would perhaps have been a decided advantage. I believe a more prudent commander would have called off the attack after the first wave of problems, since the difficulties were only increasing and they could surely only get worse. One can only think that Nelson persisted through his own vanity and his belief that British seaman could surmount anything. Obviously they couldn't, they were only human too!

To give Troubridge some credit I think he returned, perhaps not unnaturally, to enquire what he should do since the current had made it impossible for him to continue the initial assault, although one would think he should have used his own initiative. He then attempted to try again in a different place. Some authors say he was 'inebriated'. Does this mean that he, and perhaps others, took 'Dutch courage' to fortify them against what they thought was an impossible task? If this was the case, it is not surprising things went wrong if they were not in their right senses!

It seems also that Nelson ignored what is probably the first rule of warfare - don't underestimate your enemy. Indeed, the officers at least, seem to have gone to bed the night before believing themselves invincible and expecting the Spanish garrison to surrender more or less straight away! Gutierrez was well aware of the situation from the outset and was thus ready when Nelson attacked, the fact that the British had trained for the assault on board ship not really making a ha'porth of difference. In fact it would seem as though the Spanish were not a little amused by the British antics. Gutierrez was also almost twice Nelson's age and had the experience to match, having fought against the British during the American War of Independence. I have also read that the Spanish troops were not the rabble that the British expected since, as with the Roman Empire, the most seasoned troops were placed in the outposts.

My wife and I were in Tenerife a few years ago and naturally I wanted to see as much as I could to do with the attack on Santa Cruz. I think the actual beach has long since disappeared under a modern road and other development although some of the forts, I can't remember which ones, are still there, as is the church where the British took shelter. Perhaps the most poignant exhibits are in the much altered Almeida fortress, where a whole room is devoted to the assault. On display is 'el tigre' the gun which was said to have fired the fatal shot at Nelson, and the captured union jack boat flags, one bearing the name 'Emerald.'

Kester

It is also worth noting that at Santa Cruz, as well as at Boulogne, Nelson was under great political pressure to mount an attack. This does not excuse his misjudgement in deciding, in both cases, to do so, but it may go some way to explain his desperation.

Roger Knight points out that at the time of the Boulogne raid, 'He [Nelson] was under pressure from politicians to make a showing.......the government was still negotiating peace terms, and Napoloen was proving as tricky as ever. A reminder of the capacity of the British Navy to mount an attack on the coast of France, however costly in lives, was not necessarily regarded as a failure.'

Andrew Lambert remarks of the Santa Cruz attack, 'The target of the operation was money and the situation at home gave it particular significance. The war was making unprecendented demands on the British economy, enough to cause problems even for a fiscal expert such as Pitt. ...there was a run on the banks....money was in short supply and cash even more so....Nelson's operation in Tenerife was intended to find treasure to meet the crisis. It would be difficult but if successful 'with six or seven million pounds ...thrown into circulation in England, it would ensure an honourable peace'' (Nelson to St. Vincent 19 April 1797).

True, the reason for the attack on Santa Cruz was largely for monetary reasons but seeing that were the case, why wasn't any energy spent in cutting out of the two Spanish ships which were known to be at Tenerife, and loaded with silver? (We don't actually hear much about them in the accounts.) The Canaries were used as a stopover, so it would have been reasonably safe to assume that the ships wouldn't have been unloaded, if the money was destined for mainland Spain. A cutting out operation had been carried out not so long before, with I think a French frigate, so it would have been feasible and, moreover, it was work which seamen were adept at doing. Santa Cruz need not perhaps have been attacked at all, and the ships might have been gotten away before the Spanish could react.

I also seem to remember St.Vincent saying something about capturing the island. With what purpose, to be used as a base?

Another point is that the British seem to have based their erronous belief that the garrison was not well defended on the evidence of a German who came off to them. Why believe what he told them? Tom Pocock says that although the town was garrisoned by somewhat indifferent troops, Gutierrez had at his command five militias who were experienced, numbering around 1,000, and which could be drawn from all over the island.

Kester

On page 112 of '1797: Nelson's Year of Destiny', Colin White quotes a report by Captain Ralph Miller on the action. Miller and Fremantle, aboard the Seahorse, interrogated a German deserter (with Betsy Fremantle, a good linguist, as interpreter) who assured them that the Spaniards 'have no force, are in the greatest alarm....only 300 men of regular troops...the rest peasants who are frightened to death.'

Miller continues:

we agreed Fremantle should carry the information and talk to the Admiral on it (as nobody generally has less influence with an Admiral than his Captain) and endeavour to bring him on board the 'Seahorse' as there was no person in the squadron who could interpret as well as Mrs Fremantle. He accordingly went on board the 'Theseus' and soon after the signal was made 'for all Captains' and a council of war was held. The result of which was to storm the town.'

Colin White continues:

'We also know that, shortly after the council had decided to attempt another attack, Nelson received additional intelligence which increased his confidence still further. On the morning of 24 July, Captain Thomas Thompson arrived in HMS Leander. He knew Tenerife well from previous visits and his local knowledge of the town of Santa Cruz meant that Nelson could made detailed plans for the attack with some precision.

So now we know that the decision to make a second attack was not arrived at by Nelson in isolation, but was in fact urged on him by his captains at a full council of war based on apparently good intelligence.......we can now see that past suggestions that his decisions were based on overconfidence and personal pride are unfair. If there is a criticism it is, perhaps, a more subtle one: that he was not detached enough; too eager, like his captains, to find a reason for renewing the attack.'