Thank you, Brian; I am most flattered by your very kind appraisal of my article, and particularly glad that you think it an important addition to the body of knowledge. I am also very grateful for the excellent introduction that you have provided to the context of the article. Space limitations prevented me from providing such an introduction in the article itself, which I am afraid relies on the endnotes to refer readers back to the previous debate. For anyone interested in the subject who is not already familiar with Michael Duffy’s 2005 article (M. Duffy, ‘All was Hushed up: the Hidden Trafalgar’, Mariner’s Mirror 91:2, 2005), it is of course essential reading. However, an alternative is his chapter in the book ‘A Great and Glorious Victory’, in which he does also cover the same ground: M. Duffy, ‘Trafalgar: Myth & Reality’, in R. Harding, ed., A Great and Glorious Victory: The Battle of Trafalgar Conference Papers. In my opinion, the other piece of essential reading is Marianne Czisnik's article in History journal: M. Czisnik, ‘Admiral Nelson’s Tactics at the Battle of Trafalgar’, History, 89, 2004.
But I am not sure that I am quite as circumspect in the article as you perhaps suggest, Brian, and some officers are certainly not off the hook in terms of the question of reluctance to engage. Space limitations made me somewhat economical with words, but for example, I concurred with Duffy in saying that the Britannia made relatively good speed, but that Northesk held back from passing through the enemy line, and that the Britannia clearly failed to carry out Nelson’s instructions to engage closely. It is also not quite right to extrapolate that late entry into action as a result of the course chosen by the captain therefore excludes any reluctance to engage. I think I demonstrate that the very late arrival of the Prince was not primarily due to her speed (which removes one of the mainstays of Grindall’s defence), but due more to the course steered, which I suggest in the article resulted from either Grindall’s confusion or his reluctance to engage.
Duffy probably questioned more the competence of captains than their courage, and there are certainly more questions to be answered there. Your mention of the Agamemnon is one example that Duffy raised. She was late into action because she was out of position at the start of the morning. But the topmast had been repaired the previous afternoon, so why wasn’t she back in her station by the next morning? And was the loss of the topmast bad luck or bad seamanship? Then once Berry got into action, even his biographers could find little to give him credit for.
Duffy pointed out that there were more than ‘whispers of dissatisfaction in the fleet’, and that Collingwood himself privately stated that ‘some of the ships in the rear of my line, although good sailing ships, did not answer my expectations fully’. Given the performance of ships like the Britannia and Agamemnon in Nelson’s line, it intrigued me that Collingwood reserved his criticism for ships in his own line. Why? Perhaps because they were directly under his command, and certainly when he wrote that comment he was still building up a picture of what had happened, but he was by then Commander-in-chief, and would certainly have wanted to be even-handed in apportioning any blame, even if in private. It seemed to me that he felt there must have been a greater failure in his own line. On this question, Duffy left us on the edge of our seats in suspense, saying for example that the late entry of the Defence into action was ‘a mystery’, and that her slow approach was ‘inexplicable’. Well, mysteries are there to be solved…
Initially, as I started to delve into it, the mystery deepened. At daybreak, the Defence was far, far closer than any other ship to the enemy line, yet she was one of the very last ships into action. So what happened? Then there were those peculiar signals during the morning from the Defence to the Phoebe (to come to the wind) and to the Orion (first to make more sail, and then to alter course). I had wondered about those before. What was going on? Then looking at the log, the Defence was steering SbW at 11 am when the rest of the fleet was steering E or ESE for the enemy fleet. Wow! Despite all those words previously written on Trafalgar, there was very obviously a story here that hadn’t been told! It was time to plot her course…
Following the same approach paid dividends with other ships, from which a wider picture started to emerge. It seemed clear that by mid-morning, Nelson’s plan for Collingwood’s column to deliver a simultaneous and overwhelming attack on the enemy rear had been compromised by a gaping hole in Collingwood’s line. As you suggest, Kester, uncertainty amongst captains probably played a part in this, and I allude to it in the article. The word ‘confusion’ also appears in my article, and in ‘this more indiscrete website’, I think it is safe to suggest that given the lack of wind, by mid-morning the plan was in tatters! Instead, it was replaced by a plan which got Collingwood’s first eight ships into action in quick succession, but with the numerical superiority intended to deliver annihilation now reversed. I think this is the key to Collingwood’s remark about his expectations, and I hope my article goes some way to show how this situation developed, and how both Nelson and Collingwood reacted to it.
But it is very difficult to distinguish between lack of certainty, lack of competence and lack of courage, and the Polyphemus provides a good example. I show how Redmill was delayed by his curious curve to the north, but was he unsure of where he should be, or was he affected by his illness, or was he shirking?
I do suspect there was uncertainty over the importance of station keeping. Nelson’s order of battle was of great importance to his plan, with firepower concentrated at the head of the lines in the three-deckers and the larger, more heavily armed of the 74s. Only the slower Britannia, Dreadnought and Prince were ordered to form the line as convenient without regard to the order of battle, and thus all other ships were expected to take their correct station. There was also honour attached to getting into action in the correct station, so captains would have been reluctant to damage another’s honour by taking their station without that captain’s permission or without an order from the commander. It is easy to criticise too much attention to station keeping, but at what stage did captains become free to follow Nelson’s fallback order to use whatever mode of attack they thought best to get alongside an enemy?
As I say in the article, I do also believe there was uncertainty in how to execute the order in signal 76, to bear up and steer east. Strict interpretation of the order meant to bear up in succession, and thus precluded ‘cutting the corner’ to get into action quicker, which no doubt Nelson would have wished, but which Rutherford failed to do in the Swiftsure. Argument on this point was raging over a hundred years ago, but plotting the ships’ courses brings some objectivity to it.
But then there are a few ships where I did not find sufficient information to draw any conclusion, so perhaps the debate can continue for another hundred years!
_________________ Tony
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