I had completely forgotten how much of the journal that Naish had included - possibly the entirety of that particular volume?
Strangely, Colin White in ‘Nelson, the New Letters’, gives BL: Add MSS 34902 as the source for that quotation.
From the extracts that I have seen, I feel sure that Nelson wrote his private journal with an eye to publication or dissemination of some of it, not necessarily of the journal itself, but perhaps in a later memoir, or perhaps more immediately by using some of it in letters.
The entry that contains the quotation posted by Anna is a fascinating and obvious example, as he asked his brother to get part of the information it contains into the newspapers. I think it is also an illustration of the dangers of taking Nelson’s words at face value!
It relates to 22 Oct 1793 when the 64-gun Agamemnon was in action against the French 40-gun frigate La Melpomene, one of four French frigates (and a brig) he had come up with during the night. Having inflicted considerable damage on Melpomone, Nelson left off action because he feared that one of the other frigates then closing on him was actually a line of battle ship. Both John Sugden and Roger Knight give a good account of the affair, which in truth was an embarrassing failure to secure the surrender of an inferior vessel, leaving Nelson worried that he would be held to account for leaving off action. Before deciding not to renew the action, Nelson held two councils of war with his officers (and it is worth remembering his later words that
‘if a man consults whether he is to fight, when he has the power in his own hands, it is certain that his opinion is against fighting’). Afterwards he sent an account to Hood defending his actions which included a verbatim report of the council of war, and also sent an account to his brother Maurice to disseminate to the newspapers. The account sent to his brother, and the account in his private journal are both designed to mislead, and to exaggerate the danger he faced.
The entirety of the journal entry in Naish can be seen here:
http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=31EV ... &q&f=falseNelson correctly states the French force to be 4 frigates and a brig (having finally identified them correctly), but his tally of their guns is 70 nine-pounders, 16 twelve-pounders, 56 eighteen pounders and 28 thirty-six pounders. Where do those 36-pounders come from? The main armament of the French frigates was 18-pounders, so surely Nelson’s tally is manifestly false? He also states that he was
“obliged to receive the enemy’s fire under every disadvantage believing for a long time one of the enemy to have been of the line”. That is manifestly false, as during the time he was under fire, he was pursuing his opponent (which he knew to be a frigate) and the other French ships were too far away to have affected the action in any way, whether or not they included a line of battle ship. It was only when he was subsequently becalmed (for 15 minutes) and left off action that the other ships were able to close on him - although still far enough away for him apparently to mistake one in daylight as a ship of the line.
Although the four French frigates might have been able to inflict damage on Agamemnon and to cause casualties, I think it unlikely that they would have been able to capture her, unless some very lucky shot were to immobilise her in some way. Indeed they were unwilling to approach close enough to put themselves at risk of Agamemnon’s 24-pounders, especially with one of them already seriously damaged, and I think that would have been the decision of most commanders of a frigate squadron in that situation. Offhand, I cannot think of any occasion when a frigate squadron of either side was able to defeat a ship of the line (please correct me if I’m wrong), although I can think of one occasion where a British commander ordered his 4 (undamaged) frigates to leave off action against a Spanish ship of the line. And comparing the total weight of guns is fallacious – it is a bit like suggesting that half a dozen air-guns would out-gun a .303 rifle.
So if Nelson’s account in his own journal is deliberately misleading, I think you have to question the motive for his including the prayer from the Spectator. Being the cynic that I am, I think it rather too conveniently emphasises the danger he was trying to portray.
Incidentally, I wonder where he read that 1711 essay from the Spectator? Perhaps it was in Harrison’s British Classicks, published by his future biographer?