Kester, I am sure you are right that Nelson disliked ‘Councils of War’ when they were called by other people and he was a junior participant. But as a commanding officer, I think he made as much use of them as anyone else. I think the term “Council of War” is in itself confusing, because, as far as I know, a ‘CoW’ was not an officially recognised procedure, and carried no more weight than any consultation of junior officers by a commanding officer. What one author or participant may describe as a “CoW” may be described by another as a ‘consultation’, or by another as a ‘briefing’. As you say, whether or not a consultation or CoW posed a formal list of questions to the participants, the sole responsibility for any decisions rested with the commanding officer.
I would say that Nelson used briefings/consultations/CoWs at various times and to various degrees to gain information, intelligence and advice from his officers, brief them on his intentions, gain their ‘buy in’ to his plans, and also to cover his own backside.
An explicit example of the last is his CoW during the action of the Agamemnon against La Melpomène in October 1793. When La Melpomène hauled her wind to rejoin the rest of her squadron, Nelson called a ‘CoW’ to consult his officers on whether to continue the pursuit (in his log: ‘
The Captain sent for his officers to consult them’.) Having decided against continuing, he recorded a memorandum of the ‘CoW’ and sent it to Hood as part of his justification of the fact that his 64-gun ship had broken off action with a frigate:
Quote:
MEMORANDUM RELATING TO THE ACTION WITH THE FRENCH SQUADRON, ON THE 22ND OCTOBER I793
At seven o'clock sent for all the Officers to give me their opinion what the Ship on our Weather quarter was; they all agreed she was a Ship of the Line, of which opinion I was also.
At nine run into a calm, our head paid round to the Southward, the Frigates to the N. E. In about a quarter of an hour afterwards the breeze came again from the Northward: sent for the Officers to give me their opinions what the Ship on the quarter was; they all agreed she was a Line of Battle Ship, of which opinion was myself.
Question. "Do you think we can, by hauling our wind to the N. E., after the Frigate, close with her before she joins her consorts?" Answer. “No; it is impossible."
Question. “From what you see of the state of our Ship, is she fit to go into Action with such a superior force which is against us, without some small refit and refreshments for our people?" Answer. “She certainly is not."
My Orders. Mr. Wilson, 8 wear the Ship, and lay her head to the Westward, (the Enemy bore N. W. by W. three miles,) let some of the best men be employed refitting the rigging, and the carpenters getting crows and capstern bars to prevent our wounded spars from coming down, and to get the wine for the people, and some bread, for it might be half-an-hour before we were again in Action.
H. N.
The memorandum placed much emphasis on the initial mistaken identification of one of the other frigates as a ship of the line (correctly identified as a frigate an hour or two later), and of course the possibility of the enemy renewing the action.
As Nelson gained confidence, popularity and seniority, he presumably felt less inclination or need to use a ‘CoW’ for that particular purpose, and most biographers prefer to quote his opinion of CoWs expressed after Copenhagen.
St Vincent (with his less consultative leadership style!) later quoted Boscawen as describing CoWs as ‘cloaks for cowardice’.