My research has also recently involved the guard-ships, but in the slightly earlier period of 1770-75 before the American War of Independence (as we prefer to call it). The strategy of maintaining a reserve of guard-ships in commission with reduced complements seems to go back at least as far as this period, when there were 16 guard-ships stationed at the various dockyards. During the 1770 Falklands crisis, the guard-ships were quickly brought into service as the first phase of mobilisation. Although there were problems with the state of the British fleet, France and Spain were unable to match the pace of the British mobilisation, resulting in Spain backing down and war being averted. Following the Falklands crisis, the guard-ships were kept in a higher state of readiness, and were used in successful shows of strength against France with a ‘training exercise’ in the Channel in 1772 and the King’s review of the fleet at Spithead in 1773.
The King approved the policy of keeping an increased number of 20 guard-ships ready for immediate service, but with the constraints on spending during peacetime, I can’t remember offhand whether this was carried through.
My research focussed on Plymouth, where the captains of the guard-ships included some familiar (and some less familiar) names: Samuel Barrington (
Albion), John Jervis (
Foudroyant), Charles Feilding (
Kent), Joseph Knight, father of Cornelia Knight (
Ocean), and Sir Edward Hughes. I think they enjoyed a good social life!
I believe the greatest problem with the mobilisation in the American War may have been simply that it was started too late. North's government wished to delay war with France for as long as possible, and refused to mobilise in order to avoid provoking France into war. When Britain finally did mobilise, an added problem was the age of the fleet, as peacetime budgets had constrained Sandwich’s re-building programme, but the speed of mobilisation was constrained as much by the difficulties of recruiting men as by the availability of ships.
During times of mobilisation, the routes recruits took to their ships were fairly varied. For example in 1803, the
Minotaur received men at Sheerness from the
Woolwich tender,
Aggression gun-brig,
Hebe hired cutter,
Deptford tender, and a barge with 15 prisoners sent by Maidstone magistrates. At the Downs, still drastically under-manned, she received 48 men directly from an East India Man (who had probably arrived not realising war was imminent), and another 142 from the frigate
La Minerve. At Plymouth the
Defiance had just taken all but twenty of the seamen from the port-admiral’s guard-ship
Salvador del Mundo, and the
Minotaur was offered 30 pressed men -
‘all tailors, barbers, or grass-combers’! They took twenty, including the tailor.
Some captains recruited directly, hence Cochrane’s famous
recruitment poster for seamen who could carry a hundredweight of pewter for three miles without stopping.
When were receiving ships first introduced? One benefit to the rest of the fleet was that in effect they provided a period of quarantine for recruits which reduced the spread of disease to other ships – although at the expense of the other recruits.