A couple of myths promulgated by popular literature:
The British fleet sailed down to meet the enemy in two lines ahead with all sail set.
Wrong on virtually every count – it took the whole morning to form anything approaching two lines, and there were various ships that had not even rejoined their line by noon when the action commenced. Collingwood’s column was not in line ahead, but in a very ragged line of bearing (an echelon, i.e. a diagonal line), or in reality in three ragged groups. Not all ships had all sail set. The Orion’s log, for example, records that she shortened sail in order to remain in station – despite the fact that the Ajax and Orion were far behind the leading ships in Nelson’s column.
Nelson had briefed his captains on his plan so well that they all understood exactly what to do.
After the battle, there was disagreement on whether Nelson’s plan had been followed - some captains thought that Nelson had abandoned his plan altogether. Conversely, Codrington seemed to think that in some way he was still part of the third advance squadron that Nelson had abandoned. Collingwood messed up the plan from the outset by attacking too far up the enemy line and thus losing the planned numerical superiority.
Of course, none of this is new - all of it has been debated at great length over the years, but it is easy to lose sight of some of it when reading many accounts. What impresses me most is that despite abandoning much of his plan because of the weather, Nelson had such total confidence in the superiority of British seamanship and gunnery, and in the initiative of his captains, that he allowed his leading ships to be outnumbered two to one.
But what if the wind had died altogether (or swung round to the east) at 1pm...?
And what if the Temeraire had not drifted into the Redoutable when she did…?
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